What assumptions are required to achieve a n unconditionally secure distributed circuit evaluation in a fully connected network? This question was addressed with respect to the allowed number of malicious players BGW, CCD, R B ] , g i v en that every channel is unconditionally secure. In this paper we i n vestigate whether the security of all channels is also a necessary condition. BGW, CCD] showed how secure computation can be achieved, provided that a constant fraction of the total number of players is honest. An insecure channel can be modeled as faults on both ends of the channel. Thus, as long as the number of such \faulty" players is smaller then the fraction established in BGW, CCD], the channels can be made insecure. However, an insecure channel seems to be a much w eaker fault than a corruption of both players. Thus, can a bigger fraction of insecure channels be tolerated? In this paper we show that this is not the case. That is, we show that in some cases the perfect security o f m ulti-party protocols in a fully connected network requires all the channels to be physically secure. In particular, we s h o w a simple protocol (for three parties) for which i f p r i v acy of even one channel is compromised, the protocol can not be computed securely. T h us, we establish that the security o f all channels is not only su cient (by the work of BGW, CCD]), but also necessary. The lower bound holds even if players follow the protocol. That is, we establish our impossibility result even if all the players are honest but curious | if they follow the protocol exactly, but try to extract additional information \on the side". Thus, our result gives a pure security perspective of the impossibility. An additional feature of our result is its extreme simplicity, w h i c h is usually hard to come by for the lower bound proofs.
Introduction
This paper deals with feasibility results concerning the implementation of unconditionally secure computation in insecure communication environments. That is, we examine the feasibility of multi ( 3)-party secure computation. We concentrate on global computations in which all parties compute a private (possibly random) output.
The question of secure distributed computation received a lot of attention over the past decade, which culminated in the work of GMW1] where they showed a way to compute any poly-size function on a fully-connected network of processors securely, under some general cryptographic assumptions, provided that more than 2 3 of the processors are honest. The cryptographic assumptions were then eliminated in the work of BGW, CCD] where it was established that if every two processors can communicate secretly, one can achieve secure computation without any cryptographic assumptions for three or more processors (provided that either more than 1 2 are honest while the rest are honest but may be curious, or that more than 2 3 of the processors are honest in the case the rest of the processors may be Byzantine (malicious)). However, both the wo r k o f B G W , CCD] and further extensions by R B , B G ] require each pair of processors to have a secure communication channel. In this work we examine whether this condition can be weakened, and provide a strong negative answer to this question.
That is, we s h o w a g a p b e t we e n a n e t work with physically secure channels and a network without such security measures. To do so, we exhibit a protocol for which there is no perfectly secure implementation on the second model even when only one channel is unprotected. The rst model, on the other hand, is known to be universal for perfectly secure computations (even when up to 1 3 of participants are malicious BGW, CCD] .) This shows formally that adding physical security t o all channels is not just su cient but also necessary.
Notice that any insecure channel can be made secure using suitable cryptographic assumptions GMW2, GHY] . The resulting protocol, however, is only as secure as the cryptographic assumption which w as utilized. Instead, we are interested in the question of absolute security, independent o f a n y assumptions. Our proof establishes that: MAIN THEOREM: Providing physical security to all channels is necessary to the achievement of perfect security in distributed multi-party secure c omputation.
Thus, our result justi es the model of physically secure channels as a model which a c hieves universality in the set of perfectly secure computation even when the parties are computationally unlimited, provided that every channel is secure. It also justi es the use of cryptography (and achieving only computational security) when such c hannels are not available.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In section 2 we describe our model. Section 3 explains our proof, while in section 4, we review recent and related results.
The model
We consider two models of computation for multi-party protocols. Both have computationally unlimited users in a fully-connected network. The rst one has secure channels between each pair of users, while in the second model all (or some) channels are unprotected.
Both models have been used in various contexts in the past. For example, Feldman and Micali FM] implemented a fast Byzantine Agreement protocol in the secure channel model and left an open problem whether such a fast Byzantine Agreement protocol (even with relaxed performance) can be implemented on the insecure channel model. (They also show a simulation of the private channel model in the insecure channel model using cryptographic assumptions, but here we a r e i n terested in perfect security.)
A bit more formally, w e consider the model of multi-party protocols which is the standard system of communicating machines GMR]. Each player is a probabilistic Turing machine with a private computation environment. They share communication tapes and communicate by writing messages on these tapes in a synchronous fashion.
Each pair of machines share a communication tape (for each such tape only two machines are allowed to write on it). When each m a c hine has \read access" to all communication tapes this is the insecure channels model (or the bboard model), on the other hand when each o f t h e communication tapes can be accessed only by the pair of parties which are allowed to write on it { this is the secure channels model. A natural intermediate models with some private and some insecure channels can be de ned as well.
A point w orth mentioning is that the notion of secure channels can be somewhat relaxed. That is, the channels do not have to be totally secure, as we can adapt the wire-tap model of Wyner W] . (He basically assumes certain rate of being caught b y t h e e a vesdropper. By using linear codes according to the rate one gets that the users get the message while the eavesdropper does not.) Thus, the notion of \secure" channel can be interpreted in the above, weaker sense.
3 A simple proof of our result
We start with a review of Shamir, Rivest and Adleman's impossibility o f M e n tal Poker SRA] . This is a basic impossibility result (which seems to have been somewhat forgotten!) It shows that two p l a yers cannot deal a secret, disjoint, and random card hands based on information theory and open communication. Let S A (S B ) be the set of candidate cards A (B) could have gotten, given M. S A cannot contain only x since then B can compute the hand of A by s i m ulating all possible computations of A consistent with the execution. S A cannot contain all three cards since B will not be able to get any card disjoint t o S A : regardless of what card B gets, there is a computation consistent with M in which A may get the same card. Thus, S A consists of two cards. Similarly, S B must contain two cards. The total size of both candidate sets is four while the total size of the deck is three, thus there is an intersection between S A and S B , and there must be a computation consistent with M in which both players gets the same card (in this case it is z). This contradicts the disjointness requirement which implies the impossibility.
We can now g i v e a n o verview of our proof: consider the case of three nodes in the network. Note that if three players want to play a n d o n e c hannel is suspected not to be secure, they could use cryptography to solve the problem GMW2, GHY] . But this solution relies on unproven complexity assumptions, while we a r e i n terested in retaining perfect (i.e. information-theoretic) security. A protocol for dealing cards (Mental-Poker) for three or more players which a c hieved information theoretic security w as implemented, provided that all channels are secure in 1983 BaFu]. The basic idea of our proof is to show that a three player Mental-Poker is impossible if the channels are not secure.
We consider dealing of cards where there are three players and four cards in the deck. We start by assuming totally open communication. Given an execution (the protocol message sequence), none of the players can have only one card in the set of cards which are candidate to be taken to his hand consistent with the execution | this will violate security. The case of more than three cards in the candidate set is impossible as well (since if one player has more than three possible cards, then another player must have a non-disjoint card in his candidate set violating disjointedness of hands). Thus all players have t wo cards in their candidate set. However, again the deck i s t o o s m a l l t o p r o vide disjointedness of the candidate sets, that is, there must be a computation consistent with the execution in which hands are not disjoint. Thus, the dealing protocol is impossible when all channels are insecure.
Can we make the result sharper and consider a network with only one insecure channel (while the rest are secure)? We assume the same scenario and problem as before with an intermediate model of a single insecure channel (say b e t ween A and B, while both channels to C are private). We h a ve the execution which is the three sequences of messages over the three channels M ab , M ac , M bc .
Again, in this case as before, no player may h a ve a candidate set bigger than three. C may h a ve a candidate set of size one. However, both A and B must have candidate sets of size two, since otherwise C who knows all the messages can determine their cards. The sum of the sizes of the candidate card sets from C's point of view is at least 5 while only 4 cards are present in the deck. (The other players see even less information than C and thus their view of the computation should also leave candidate set of size 2.) This is a contradiction to disjointedness.
Thus, in this case even one public channel prevents a perfectly secure implementation:
Theorem: There exists protocols which can not be e x e cuted s e curely in the informationtheoretic sense on a fully-connected network if any one of the channels is compromised.
This proves the necessity of secure channels in the case of computationally unbounded parties.
Related work
Recently, O VY] considered a two-party asymmetric games when one of the players is in nitelypowerful while the other is polynomially-bounded. Using the proof method similar to the above, they were able to show that information-theoretic Oblivious Transfer protocol is impossible to achieve. Moreover, non-interactive Oblivious Transfer was also shown to be impossible. On the positive side, they were able to show that if one-way functions exist, then any t wo-party asymmetric game (for example, Oblivious Transfer protocol) is possible to implement.
Further study of requirements for multi-party secure computation, when the network is not fully connected was done by DDWY], where they presented tight results on the required connectivity of the network in order to preserve security.
